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I.

INTRODUCTION

Issues dealing with children who have been neglected, abused,
or otherwise harmed and have been through the social welfare
system and placed in foster care, continue to be baffling for both
social services and the courts. Yet, the question continues to be,
what do we do with them now? It has been agreed for years that,
historically, “[n]umerous transfers from one caregiver to another
can have a negative impact on the child’s development and sense
1
of belonging,” and within that context, the failure of the court
system to provide for children during child protection proceedings
and after termination of parental rights (TPR) of the biological
parents has caused significant and ongoing conflict. In many cases
these proceedings have been detrimental to the child, poorly
thought out by social services, unsupported by the courts, and
unsuccessful in alleviating the problems of providing stability for
these children.
In addressing this problem, concepts of “concurrent planning”
were developed with the original thought that a permanent
placement of a child after the TPR of the biological parents was, in

1. Jane Ranum, Minnesota’s Permanency and Concurrent Planning Child Welfare
System, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687, 688 (2000). “The hallmark of good child
welfare social work is the ability to rapidly secure a child’s physical and emotional
well-being in the context of her family of origin or in another permanent family.”
Id. (quoting MARY FORD, THREE CONCURRENT PLANNING PROGRAMS: HOW THEY
BENEFIT CHILDREN AND SUPPORT PERMANENCY PLANNING FAMILIES 2 (1998)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss3/6

2

Driver and Walling: Examining the Intersection of Chemical Dependency and Mental Heal

1010

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

2

fact, in the child’s best interests. In addition, it was assumed that
3
permanent placement was, in fact, permanent placement. It is in
this context that changes in the attitudes of the courts and social
services were first confronted, and it is within this context that
children have been circulated and returned back into the system
4
after an original “permanent placement” has failed. Thus, social
welfare systems were directed to not only begin preparing case
plans to try to reunify children with their parents upon their initial
entry into the system, but at the same time to make plans
“concurrently,” assuming that if reunification of the child was
unsuccessful, then some permanent placement would end the
5
journey.
“Concurrent planning is a form of permanent planning that
seeks to limit the amount of time a child, in the child welfare
system, waits for a permanent home. The focus of concurrent
planning is on those children for whom reunification with a parent
6
is not likely.” As a result of this shift in attitude, various statutory
changes were implemented to give assistance to persons providing
permanent placement for children, and, simultaneously, time
limits were placed upon the welfare system and the courts, during
which they were required to move forward towards permanency
even if the original case plan for reunification had not been
7
completed. It was noted:
[T]he goal of concurrent planning is to abridge this
process so that reunification efforts occur simultaneously
with other efforts to establish a permanent home for the
child. Contrary to conceptual simplicity, . . . concurrent
planning is the product of a decade long effort to
promote permanency. These efforts were propelled, to a
8
great extent, by federal government actions.

2. For further background, see Wright S. Walling & Stacia W. Driver,
Celebrating 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—a Historical Overview and
Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883 (2006).
3. See id. at 915–16.
4. For further background, see Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private
CHIPS Petitions in Minnesota: The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in
Need of Protection or Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781 (1994).
5. Ranum, supra note 1, at 688.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 696.
8. Id. at 689.
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As pressure mounted to place children in “permanent homes”
more quickly, social welfare systems and courts began to reach out
to prospective adoptive parents, including relatives, to provide
9
permanent and, in most cases, adoptive homes for these children.
At the time they were being recruited, adoptive parents received
almost no education and little information regarding the children
10
was given to them. In fact, often the information coming out of a
child protection or court file was not given to the social workers
handling the adoption, and it was most definitely not given to the
adoptive parents. The foundation for success was often severely
lacking.
As a process of concurrent planning was developed and
implemented in an effort at reunification, the expected and
obvious conflict between effective development of case plans on
behalf of families and the timelines pushing toward the
permanency of a placement for a child became more and more
obvious. Furthermore, when a parent’s chemical dependency or
mental health was at issue, treatment often could not be completed
before the statutory deadline to complete the case plan, inevitably
11
leading to TPR. The result has often been a mishmash of
9. See Patrick Yagle, When Adoption Goes Wrong: Giving Up Custody to Get Kids
the Mental Help They Need, ILL. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011, 2:40 PM), http://illinoistimes
.com/article-8964-when-adoption-goes-wrong.html; see also Kelli Kennedy, Experts
Push Disclosure of Failed Foster Adoptions, READING EAGLE (Aug. 22, 2011, 4:53 AM),
http://www2.readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=327803 (discussing the difficulties
of adopting foster children and the lack of services available to adoptive families).
10. “Overall statistical reports reveal very few dissolutions and disruptions.”
CYNTHIA R. MABRY & LISA KELLY, ADOPTION LAW: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 705
(2006). One report indicates that after an adoption is finalized, only 0.4% to 5.4%
of adoptions are dissolved. Id. Some have been critical of such studies:
Some reports are criticized, however, because they are limited to small
populations of children or one geographical area. Also, all studies use
the same subjects—children who are adopted from public agencies—
so no information is available for rates of dissolutions and disruptions
in private adoptions. States either do not collect the information,
inaccurately record the information, utilize different definitions for
dissolution and disruption, or are reluctant to disclose the data.
Id. In addition, however, “the disruption rate for adoptions ranges from ten to
twenty-five percent of adoptions depending upon how an empirical study is
conducted (i.e., older adoptees are isolated from the study or the study
encompasses children from only one state).” Id. For older children, the disruption
rate is much higher at twenty-five percent. Id. “The highest rate of disruption
occurs within the first twelve to eighteen months of the placement.” Id. at 705–06.
11. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1 (2012).
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confusing standards applied by courts, social services, and
individuals based on personalities and work ethics rather than
treatment needs, goals, or recognition of family.
This crisis has resulted from the lack of training and
understanding of the issues by social workers and therapists, as well
as the lack of creative statutory criteria designed to deal with these
issues and provide the support and stability needed by the children
12
and the parents. It is, in fact, a failure of an essentially self-created
system, which uses a short-term model that does not account for
the long-term needs of children and families.
II. EARLY MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE
From a historical perspective, Minnesota developed its
statutory history and background in a similar manner to other
states around the country. These changes reflected the social
movements occurring on a national level, and Minnesota, as did
other states, began early in the twentieth century to specifically
13
address the needs of “dependent and neglected” children. From
that point to today, the manner in which the courts and mental
health social services deal with such children has been hotly
debated as the social movement and philosophical decisions have
14
shifted back and forth. More specifically, the early Minnesota
“neglect” statute, enacted in 1905, reflects the broad and sweeping
powers similar to those found in other states and enacted at the
15
turn of the century. Often the child could be removed for
undetermined reasons of parental unfitness, including poverty in a
variety of forms.
As noted in other articles detailing the issue’s historical
background, even these early statutes reflect the debate that exists
today over whether it is the responsibility of the state or the family
16
to protect and punish “dependent or neglected” children. While
recognizing the authority and control of the state through its
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 808–26.
Id. at 794–815.
See id.
See Act approved Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 7, 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 418;
ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987); Walling &
Debele, supra note 4, at 802–08.
16. See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 798–815 (exploring the historical
background of the Minnesota statutes).
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course, the statutes began to look at other options and other
persons to file petitions alleging that children were neglected or
dependent, as long as such persons resided in the county and knew
17
of the child who appeared to be neglected or dependent.
Yet, as often noted, these hundred-year-old statutes provided
few procedural protections for children. They nevertheless
recognized the interrelationship between the authority and
discussions with the court system, the general responsibility of
families to police their own members, and the bringing of
appropriate matters to the attention of the court system to work
18
with social services mental health professionals.
As with statutes passed in other states at the turn of the
century, early dependency and neglect statutes in Minnesota
struggled to define exactly what a “dependent” or “neglected” child
was, or should be. These statutes define circumstances under which
nondelinquent behavior by children should be brought before the
court and, more specifically, how these children should be dealt
19
with.
Comments by courts and professionals in the early twentieth
century reflect the ongoing and continuing attempts at dealing
with individualized issues for specific children through the
20
development of ongoing programs. Writing in the first issue of
the Minnesota Law Review, Judge Edward F. Waite of the Hennepin
County Juvenile Court stated, “We live in what has been aptly
17. Walling & Driver, supra note 2, at 898.
18. See id. at 904–13.
19. Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 803. The 1905 statute defined
“dependent child” and “neglected child” as follows:
[A]ny child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned;
or dependent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental
care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or receives alms; or who is
found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or disreputable
persons, or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on
the part of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may
be, is an unfit place for such a child; and any child under the age of
ten (10) years who is found begging, peddling or selling any articles or
singing or playing any musical instrument upon the street, or giving
any public entertainment, or who accompanies or is used in aid of any
person so doing.
Act approved Apr. 19, 1905, § 7, 1905 Minn. Laws at 418 (“An act to regulate the
treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children.”).
20. See, e.g., Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L.
REV. 48 (1917).
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termed the ‘century of the child.’ Never before have the
obligations of society to its more helpless members been so
generally recognized; and of all forms of helpless that of childhood
21
makes the strongest and most universal appeal.” In describing the
approach taken by the court, Judge Waite listed what he believed to
be the specific and significant accomplishments that the State of
Minnesota had achieved in addressing the needs of dependent and
neglected children, including the creation of reform schools for
youthful offenders, schools for the deaf and blind, juvenile courts,
state hospitals for crippled children, and “Mother’s Pensions,”
which were, in his opinion, a significant movement toward helping
these children who find themselves in the category of neglected
22
and dependent children. The programs largely reflected the
developments occurring in other states and, from a needs
standpoint, are reflective of the considerations existing in the
twenty-first century in attempting to deal with the specific
23
individualized needs of children.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
During the 1970s the number of children entering the public
24
care system increased significantly. This increase resulted in
25
children staying in the system much longer than in previous years.
As lawmakers became increasingly concerned by the number of
children in the protection system, coupled with the lack of
standard procedures, Congress initially enacted the Adoption
26
Assistance of Child Welfare Act of 1980.
While “[t]he Act’s laudatory goals were to discourage excessive
reliance on foster care placement and to permit greater use of
21. Id. at 48.
22. Id. at 48–49.
23. See id.
24. See Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for
Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 445
(2003).
25. Id. at 446 (“The numbers of children placed in foster care has grown in
part due to limited availability of resources for other forms of familial support and
in part due to state laws and regulations that created a process for removing a
child from the home but were less clear on how to help the families . . . . Stays in
foster care turned out to be long for many children . . . .”). For a general
discussion of the issues, see Walling & Debele, supra note 4.
26. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500.
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27

services assisting in family reunification,” it also resulted in
28
slowing the process of placing children in permanent homes.
More specifically:
[T]he legislative goals were not realized by thousands of
children, and disproportionately for children of color.
[Data showed] that while children of color [made] up
35% of the general population, [those] children [made]
up 64% of the children in foster care. Furthermore,
children of color [were] more likely than white children
to be placed in foster care and once placed, generally
[stayed] in foster care longer and wait[ed] to be adopted
29
longer than white children.
Despite the intent of the adoption assistance program’s initial
federal legislation, statutes and rules were created in an effort to
move children more swiftly into permanency both on the state and
30
federal level. In addition, the process became more complicated
because states now had to determine if a child was eligible for
adoption assistance and, if so, how much. They were required to
inform potential placement resources of the availability of adoption
31
assistance funds as well. Since states had limited funds from which
to draw adoption assistance, these inquiries and new eligibilities
became a lengthy ordeal, again, slowing down the entire
permanency process. Action was necessary to avoid this slow down.
IV. SWIFT MOVEMENT TO PERMANENCY
Pressure began to build to provide quicker permanent
placements for special needs children.
In December 1996, President Clinton directed the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, Donna Shalala, to conduct consultations and
provide specific strategies to move children more quickly
from foster care to permanent homes. His goal was to
double the number of adoptions or permanent
32
placements in five years.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ranum, supra note 1, at 689.
See id.
Id.
See infra Parts IV, V.
MINN. STAT. § 259A.05, subdiv. 4(b) (2012).
Ranum, supra note 1, at 689–90.
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The result was the creation of the Adoption 2000 Blueprint in
33
February 1997. Among other things, the Blueprint, reflecting the
attitude of social services and of the courts at the time, was based
on the following eight assumptions:
(1) Every child deserves a safe and permanent family;
(2) Children’s health and safety is a paramount concern
that must guide all child welfare services;
(3) Children deserve prompt and timely decision-making
as to who their permanent caregivers will be;
(4) Permanency planning begins when a child enters
foster care; foster care is a temporary setting;
(5) Adoption is one of the pathways to a permanent
family;
(6) Adoptive families require support after the child’s
adoption is legalized;
(7) The diversity and strengths of all communities must
be tapped; and
(8) Quality services must be provided as quickly as
possible to enable families in crisis to address
34
problems.
Based on these assumptions, the federal government passed
35
the Adoption of Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) to address
critical issues in the child welfare system. This legislation
incorporated the assumptions of the Adoption 2000 Blueprint and
laid the groundwork for major child welfare reform—and in
particular resulted in a shorter foster care period for children and
36
a faster path to “permanent” homes. The five key principles of
ASFA are:
(1) Safety is a paramount concern that must guide all
child welfare services;
(2) Foster care is temporary;
(3) Child welfare system[s] must focus on results and
accountability;
(4) Innovative approaches are needed to achieve the goals
of safety, permanency, and well-being; and

33. Id. at 690.
34. Id.
35. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111
Stat. 2115.
36. Ranum, supra note 1, at 690.
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(5) Permanency planning efforts should begin as soon as
37
the child enters care.
It is this last principle that really puts the emphasis and
importance on “concurrent planning” by the states. “While ASFA
did not require . . . concurrent planning, the Act [allowed for and]
opened the door for states . . . to establish concurrent planning
38
programs.” In addition, the federal statute assisted states by
providing that “‘reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or
with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable
39
efforts’ to preserve and reunify families.” Technical assistance was
40
also provided.
The incentive was now set for legislative and rulemaking action
to move children through foster care systems more quickly. Moving
children more quickly through the system resulted in less emphasis
on reunification and more emphasis on recruitment of adoptive
families to provide for the permanency needs of these special-needs
children.
V. STATES’ REACTIONS
Due to extended delays in the foster care placement process,
Adoption 2000’s stress on moving the process quicker, and the
ASFA legislation, states began to enact statutes and rules regarding
necessary timelines in order to move children out of foster care
41
quickly. “Concurrent planning” through the court system began

37. Id. at 690–91.
38. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012).
39. Ranum, supra note 1, at 691 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F)).
40. Id.
41. By way of example, and as a result of extended delays in the placement
process described herein, states like Minnesota enacted legislation. See Act of
May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 3, § 23, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 661. These rules set rigid
timelines for permanency in order to facilitate quick placement. Minnesota Rule
of Juvenile Protection Procedure 42.01 states:
[A] child who is under eight (8) years of age at the time a petition is
filed alleging the child to be in need of protection or services, the
court shall conduct a permanency progress review hearing . . . not later
than six (6) months after the child is placed in foster care or in the
home of a noncustodial parent.
MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01, subdiv. 5(a). The purpose of these time requirements
is clear. They are meant to speed along the placement process which, presumably,
is in the child’s best interests. The issue, however, is that requiring placement
within a said period of time often has the effect of rushing placement
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to dominate over case plans and reunification of children with
42
parents. Once federal law allowed changes in statutory movements
towards permanency, states began to enact the appropriate
43
legislation.
In implementing the conceptual “concurrent planning” with
permanency issues in general, a confluence of two dominant
themes in child welfare emerged: the “attachment theory” and
44
“foster care drift.” The attacking of and the interrelationship
between these two themes led to dramatic movement by
legislatures to set permanency guidelines. People in the system
were concerned about the impact of the law and the impact that
multiple placements had on children—specifically how they
affected a child’s development of healthy and permanent
45
attachments to permanent caregivers.
Most states began to set short time limits, anywhere from six
46
months to one year of out-of-home placement. By that time, social
welfare systems and courts were required to move toward TPR or
some other sort of permanency. In most cases, this involved
recruitment of adoptive parents and the placement of children who
were maltreated, suffering unhealthy attachments, or otherwise
47
abused into “permanent” adoptive homes. Standard rules in many
states require movement towards permanency for a child under the
age of eight within six months of the filing of a dependency,
neglect, abuse, or protective services petition; or within one year
for any child eight years of age or older at the time of removal from
48
the home. By the end of that time period the court is required in
most states to conduct a permanency progress review hearing
49
requiring movement towards permanency. Reunification is only
allowed if all of the family, chemical dependency, and mental
illness issues have been significantly resolved.
Factors to consider when conducting concurrent permanency
planning are: the age of the child, the child’s special needs, the
considerations, ultimately leading to a higher disruption rate.
42. Ranum, supra note 1, at 69192.
43. See, e.g., Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, §§ 1–3, 1988 Minn.
Laws 1031, 1031–33.
44. Ranum, supra note 1, at 693 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.204(a) (2012); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01.
47. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201; MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.
48. See, e.g., MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01, subdiv. 5.
49. See id.
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duration of the out-of-home placement, the prognosis for
successful reunification with the parents, the availability of relatives
or other concerned individuals that provide support or permanent
placement for the child, and other factors affecting the child’s
50
interests.
The system has sped up; children are being placed for
permanency and adoptive homes more quickly. Simultaneously,
however, there is a lack of time and funding to train the people
who determine and assess case plans for parents to work to have
their children return home. Thus, the path is set for a breakdown
in coordinating timelines in the system between permanency for
children and necessary mental health and chemical dependency
treatment plans for parents.
VI. MINNESOTA’S CURRENT STATUTORY STRUCTURE
As practitioners, scholars, and politicians throughout the
country debated philosophical attitudes and attempted to
implement various approaches to dealing with neglected and
dependent children, significant concern began to arise as to
whether the labeling of a child as “neglected,” a family as having
“neglected,” or a child as “dependent” provided some stigma51
tization of the child and the family. Throughout the country, and
particularly in Minnesota, this resulted in language changes
eliminating the words “neglect” and “dependent” in the provisions
52
of the statute.
In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature created the category of the
53
“Child in Need of Protection or Services” (CHIPS). This largely
consisted of a consolidation of the previously delegated categories
of “dependent” and “neglected,” but shifted from the previous
54
categorization to a new category of a CHIPS child. It is debatable
whether or not the resulting shift to a new categorization and
terminology has reduced the stigmatization of being involved in a
court system and having families’ lives directed by social services.

50. Ranum, supra note 1, at 696.
51. See Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 782.
52. Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, §§ 1–2, 1988 Minn. Laws 1031, 1032;
Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 809–10.
53. See Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, §§ 1–3, 1988 Minn. Laws at 1031–33.
54. Walling & Debele, supra note 4, at 810.
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Nevertheless, Minnesota no longer has “dependent” or “neglected”
55
children but rather has “CHIPS” children.
Additionally, the court proceedings are now referred to as
“juvenile protection proceedings” wherein the adjudication
determining that a child is a CHIPS child are handled, and
Minnesota statutory criteria have very specific direction and
56
philosophical goals with respect to those children. As reflected in
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.001, subdivision 2, the direction to
the courts and social services by the statute state in part:
(a) The paramount consideration in all juvenile
protection proceedings is the health, safety, and best
interest of the child. . . .
(b) The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile
protection proceedings is:
(1) to secure for each child under the jurisdiction
of the Court, the care and guidance, preferably in the
child’s own home, as will best serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child;
(2) to provide judicial procedures that protect the
welfare of the child;
(3) to preserve and strengthen the child’s family
ties whenever possible and in the child’s best interests,
removing the child from the custody of parents only
when the child’s welfare or safety cannot be
adequately safeguarded without removal;
....
(5) to ensure that when placement is pursuant to
court order, the court order removing the child or
continuing the child in foster care contains an
individualized determination that placement is in the
best interests of the child that coincides with the
actual removal of the child;
(6) to ensure that when the child is removed, the
child’s care and discipline is, as nearly as possible,
equivalent to that which should have been given by
57
the parents . . . .
Minnesota statutes here, and in other places within this part of
the juvenile code, also describe in detail the requirements of the
55.
56.
57.

Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2 (2012).
Id.
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creation of a case plan after a child is removed from the home or
deemed to be a CHIPS child, the requirements and timing with
respect to looking at permanent placement, the available services
through a “disposition plan” in the juvenile court for a CHIPS
child, and the requirement of pursuing “concurrent planning” any
58
time a child is removed from the home. The concurrent planning
aspect discussed below provides the inherent conflict between
statutory comments and mental health, chemical dependency, and
other family-centered and individualized case plans.
VII. MINNESOTA’S DEFINITION OF CHIPS CHILDREN: HOW FAMILIES
ENTER THE COURT AND SOCIAL SERVICES MAZE
As the legislature struggled through the years with how to
define those children and families who should come within the
purview of required intervention by the state and social services
personnel into their families, the legislature has similarly struggled
to define a CHIPS child, providing an ever-increasing number of
59
circumstances. Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 6
provides detailed statutory criteria for defining a Child in Need of
60
Protection or Services. More specifically, it states that a child may
be found to be a Child in Need of Protection or Services if:
(1) the child is abandoned;
(2) the child is a victim of physical or sexual abuse or emotional
maltreatment, resides with a victim of child abuse, or resides
with a perpetrator of child abuse;
(3) the child lacks “necessary food, clothing, shelter, education,
or other required care”;
(4) the child lacks “special care made necessary by a physical,
mental, or emotional condition”;
(5) the child is medically neglected;
(6) the child’s “parent, guardian, or other custodian for good
cause desires to be relieved of the child’s care and custody”;
(7) the child was placed for adoption or care in violation of law;
(8) the child lacks proper parental care;

58. Id. §§ 260C.001, subdiv. 2, 260C.201, subdiv. 1, 6.
59. See id. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6 (Supp. 2013); see also Act of May 23, 2013,
ch. 108, art. 3, § 39, 2013 Minn. Laws 765, 765–66 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6) (amending certain definitions).
60. MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6.
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(9) the child’s “behavior, condition, or environment is such as to
be injurious or dangerous to the child or others”;
(10) the child is “experiencing growth delays, which may be
referred to as failure to thrive, that have been diagnosed by a
physician and are due to parental neglect”;
(11) the child is exploited sexually;
(12) the child “has committed a delinquent act or a juvenile petty
offense before becoming ten years old”;
(13) the child is a runaway;
(14) the child is a habitual truant;
(15) the child “has been found incompetent to proceed or has
been found not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental
deficiency in connection with a delinquency proceeding”; or
(16) the child “has a parent whose parental rights to one or more
other children were involuntarily terminated or whose
custodial rights to another child have been involuntarily
transferred to a relative and . . . the responsible social services
agency document[ed] a compelling reason why filing the
termination of parental rights petition . . . is not in the best
61
interests of the child.”
Once a child and a family have been determined to fit within
one of these broad categories, two things of significance happen.
First, the court considers what disposition or treatment plan should
62
be ordered and imposed upon the family and the child. Second,
despite the definition and direction to work toward reunification of
the child with the parents, the statutory criteria require immediate
commencement of work to find a permanent placement for the
63
child in a place other than his original home.
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.001 provides dispositions
64
available to the court and social services. These possible
alternatives run the gamut from providing in-home services to the
family by the responsible social services agency to removal of the
child and the transfer of legal custody to the responsible social
65
services agency. When an out-of-home placement is required, the
responsible social services agency is required to prepare an out-of-

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2(b)(7) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 260C.001.
Id. § 260C.212.
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66

home placement plan within thirty days. The plan is supposed to
be prepared jointly with a parent or guardian in consultation with
the child’s guardian ad litem, foster parent, or representative foster
67
parent where appropriate. The plan is intended to provide a
mechanism for return and reunification of the child with his
68
parents upon completion of the plan. This plan is required to
provide specific reasons for the placement of the child and a
description of the problems or conditions in the home of the
parent or parents that necessitate a removal of the child from the
69
home in the first place. It also must specify the changes a parent
70
or parents must make in order for the child to safely return home.
The responsible social services agency is then required to make
“reasonable efforts” to assist the family in accomplishing the goals
set for them in the case plan that resulted from the original need to
71
have the child removed.
However, as a limitation to the “reasonable efforts”
requirement, the statutes also support concurrent planning. For
every child in foster care, the court must commence proceedings to
determine permanent status of the child by holding an admit/deny
hearing on a permanency petition, usually a TPR petition, no later
than twelve months after the child is placed in foster care or in the
72
care of noncustodial or nonresident parents.
Thus, the statutes insist on “concurrent planning” where the
responsible social services agency is both theoretically providing a
case plan for reunification and making reasonable efforts to reunify
the family while at the same time planning exactly the opposite by
looking at TPR or other permanency petition within a maximum of
73
a twelve-month period.
VIII. CONCURRENT PLANNING AS THE MINNESOTA APPROACH
As noted, the essence of concurrent planning evolved
historically from the actions taken on the national level as well as
the state level. Problems in looking at long-term foster care
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1.
Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(b).
See id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c).
Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c)(2).
Id.
Id. § 260.212, subdiv. 1(c)(3)(ii).
Id. § 260C.503, subdiv. 1.
See id.
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placements, jumping of foster homes, and little work by the county
to actually try to reunify families have prompted a commitment
across the country for fairly swift movement from reunification
planning to permanency planning. Such movement is based on the
assumption that a permanent placement of the child away from his
or her parents is in fact in the child’s best interests in all
circumstances if that child cannot return home.
More specifically, Minnesota has codified the issues of
concurrent permanency planning at Minnesota Statutes section
260C.223. Within that statute, it is indicated that
concurrent permanency planning involves a planning
process for children who are placed out of the home of
their parents pursuant to court order, or were voluntarily
placed out of the home for 60 days or more who are
developmentally disabled or emotionally disabled . . . .
The responsible social services agency shall develop an
alternate permanency plan while making reasonable
efforts for reunification of the child with family if required
74
by section 260.012.
In what almost seems to be contradictory on its face, the
statute goes on to say that:
[T]he goals of concurrent planning are to:
(1) achieve early permanency for children;
(2) decrease children’s length of stay in foster care
and reduce the number of children experiencing foster
care; and
(3) develop a group of families who will work toward
reunification and also serve as permanent families for
75
children.
The thought is that social services workers, many of whom are
often working on both sides of the concurrent planning at the
same time, can be neutral and objective in providing all of the
reasonable services, particularly when they may not be trained in
the actual treatment as is necessary to accomplish development of a
healthy family.
Subdivision 5 only requires the development of guidelines and
76
protocols if there is available funding, something that in recent
times has not been as forthcoming as necessary.
74.
75.
76.

Id. § 260C.223, subdiv. 1 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. § 260C.223, subdiv. 5.
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IX. PERMANENCY CONSIDERATION AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS: A BLOCKADE TO EFFECTIVE TREATMENT OUTCOMES
At this point in the system, we have a child who is out of the
home. A treatment plan has been developed, supposedly dealing
with the individualized needs of each child and family. As a more
practical reality, however, case plans and treatment plans become a
litany of checklists applicable in most cases to all families. They
virtually always include a complete psychological evaluation,
complete chemical dependency evaluation, complete parenting
evaluation, and in every case a requirement that whatever is found
in those evaluations, and whatever recommendations are made, be
communicated to the parents or the child. This is often true
regardless of whether or not any of these issues were the primary
reason for the child being removed from the home.
Treatment plans also disregard whether or not it is logical to
believe that someone with a character disorder, schizophrenia, or
other behavioral mental illness can be successfully “cured” in the
time limits required by statute. That consideration, however, is not
part of the statutory scheme. Rather, as noted, the statutory scheme
focuses on how much time has run since the removal of the child
77
rather than the steps taken toward reunification. At the outset,
some permanency petition, usually the TPR petition, must be
heard in court at an admit/deny hearing within twelve months of
78
the date of the removal of the child. Once the concurrent
planning track dealing with permanency has taken control, the
effectiveness of any ongoing attempts at reunification is virtually
79
eliminated. We now move into categories for proving that an
involuntary TPR is appropriate.
It is at that point we also then turn to Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.301, which gives us a list of the categories of children
80
and situations where TPR is allowed. Once again, there is a broad,
sweeping scope of those children where TPR is going to be
granted. More specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1 states as follows:

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 260C.204.
Id. § 260C.503, subdiv. 1.
See id. § 260C.212, subdiv. 1–2.
Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b).
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Subdivision 1. Voluntary and involuntary. The juvenile
court may upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent
to a child:
(a) with the written consent of a parent who for good
cause desires to terminate parental rights; or
(b) if it finds that one or more of the following
conditions exist:
(1) that the parent has abandoned the child;
(2) that the parent has substantially, continuously,
or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the
duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and
child relationship;
(3) that a parent has [failed to pay child
support] . . . . ;
(4) that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to
the parent and child relationship . . . . ;
(5) that following the child’s placement out of the
home, reasonable efforts . . . have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s placement. It is
presumed that reasonable efforts . . . have failed upon
a showing that:
(i) a child has resided out of the parental
home under court order for a cumulative period
of 12 months within the preceding 22 months. In
the case of a child under age eight . . . , the
presumption arises when the child has resided out
of the parental home . . . for six months unless the
parent has maintained regular contact with the
child and the parent is complying with the out-ofhome placement plan;
(ii) the court has approved the out-of-home
placement plan . . . and filed with the court under
section 260C.178;
(iii) conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected. . . . ; and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.
This clause does not prohibit the termination of
parental rights prior to one year, or in the case of a
child under age eight, prior to six months after a child
has been placed out of the home.
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It is also presumed that reasonable efforts have
failed under this clause upon a showing that:
(A) the parent has been diagnosed as
chemically dependent . . . ;
(B) the parent has been required by a case
plan to participate in a chemical dependency
treatment program;
(C) the treatment programs offered to the
parent were culturally, linguistically, and clinically
appropriate;
(D) the parent has either failed two or more
times to successfully complete a treatment
program or has refused at two or more separate
meetings with a caseworker to participate in a
treatment program; and
(E) the parent continues to abuse chemicals.
(6) that a child has experienced egregious harm
in the parent’s care . . . ;
(7) that in the case of a child born to a mother
who was not married to the child’s father when the
child was conceived nor when the child was born the
person is not entitled to notice of an adoption
hearing . . . and the person has not registered with the
fathers’ adoption registry . . . ;
(8) that the child is neglected and in foster care;
or
(9) that the parent has been convicted of a crime
listed in section 260.012, paragraph (g), clauses (1)
81
to (5).
Critically, section 260C.301, subdivision 1, paragraph b,
clause 5 states that parental rights may be terminated if, after the
child is placed out of the home, reasonable efforts have failed to
82
correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement. There are
then specific circumstances under which reasonable efforts are
presumed, but the reality is that the burden appears to shift to the
parent to show that reasonable efforts have not existed or been
83
offered by the responsible social services agency.

81.
82.
83.

Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1.
Id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(5).
See id.
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X. CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY AND MENTAL HEALTH—
A GENERAL OVERVIEW
As described in previous sections of this article, there is a
continuing disconnect between the worlds of law and mental
health. We see this in child protection cases, specifically confronted
when the timeline for a permanency petition runs into the ongoing
treatment of a mental health or chemical dependency issue for the
parent or child. Therapies, diagnostics and approaches to
treatment must be considered in determining how the disconnect
between the law and mental health arose and why it continues
today.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) is a series of manuals designed to categorize and organize
84
mental disorders. The American Psychiatric Association published
the fifth edition in 2013. The DSM-5 “is a classification of mental
disorders with associated criteria designed to facilitate more
85
reliable diagnoses of these disorders.” Historically, “it has become
a standard reference for clinical practice in the mental health
86
field.” This manual is technically designed for clinical practice.
87
However, it has been increasingly used in other fields. As
specifically stated in the DSM-5, the information is useful and may
be valuable to “all professionals associated with various aspects of
mental health care, including psychiatrists, other physicians,
psychologists, social workers, nurses, counselors, forensic and legal
specialists, occupational and rehabilitation therapists, and other
88
health professionals.” From this definitional information we see
the very players we also see in the child protection system: social
workers and legal specialists (lawyers). It is essential that social
workers and lawyers have an understanding of what tools are being
used by the diagnosticians.
Often a child protection social worker has a background in
social science, social work, or psychology. More often though,
judges, lawyers, and legislators, who assist in drafting and passing

84. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (Susan K. Schultz & Emily A. Kuhl eds., 5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter
DSM-5].
85. Id. at xli.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and applying these laws, do not. This becomes problematic when
the basic tenets and tools for success in the arena of mental health
concerns do not work with permanency timelines and what we, as
society and legal specialists, have deemed best for children.
As would be expected, there is a significant amount of
expertise that goes into developing and constructing the DSM-5. It
“is intended to serve as a practical, functional, and flexible guide
for organizing information that can aid in the accurate diagnosis
89
and treatment of mental disorders.” The DSM-5 is broken down
into a variety of categories, and working groups of psychologists,
PhDs, MDs, and consultants worked in conjunction on each group
90
for over twelve years. The major classifications are as follows:
(1) Neurodevelopmental Disorders;
(2) Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders;
(3) Bipolar and Related Disorders;
(4) Depressive Disorders;
(5) Anxiety Disorders;
(6) Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders;
(7) Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders;
(8) Dissociative Disorders;
(9) Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders;
(10) Feeding and Eating Disorders;
(11) Elimination Disorders;
(12) Sleep-Wake Disorders;
(13) Sexual Dysfunctions;
(14) Gender Dysphoria;
(15) Disruptive, Impulse-Control, and Conduct Disorders;
(16) Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders;
(17) Neurocognitive Disorders;
(18) Personality Disorders;
(19) Paraphilic Disorders;
(20) Other Mental Disorders;
(21) Medication-Induced Movement Disorders and Other Adverse
Effects of Medication; and
91
(22) Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention.

89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at xliii, 5.
Id. at 27.
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In the CHIPS and TPR legal systems, many classifications do
not often arise, or at least are not commonly diagnosed in a way
that is seen by the legal practitioners who practice in juvenile court.
It certainly does not mean that they cannot arise; they are just not
as commonly seen or diagnosed. Also, it is difficult to miss, in
looking at this list, the practical ramification of this list itself.
Perhaps it is longer than one might anticipate; it is certainly clear
that it involves a spectrum of disorders and diagnoses that many
people, including lawyers and legislators, have never heard of. “As a
result, it is important to note that the definition of mental disorder
included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians,
public health professionals, and research investigators rather than
92
all of the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”
However, to appropriately function in the legal aspects of child
protection, a practitioner must have at least a basic understanding
and education of the metal health issues that are often an
underlying component of the parents’ or child’s functioning.
It is also essential to remember that mental illness alone and
the possibility of chemical dependency issues do not result in
93
children automatically being removed from a parent. Ultimately,
in many situations there is an underlying mental health or
chemical dependency issue for the parents of children who may
94
end up in the child protection system. Oftentimes this is seen as
alcohol abuse, a variety of drug use, or mental health disorders that
result in a parent being unable to care for a child due to that
95
disorder. Again, many parents with underlying mental health
96
issues do not find their way into the child protection system. But
oftentimes the ones who are in the child protection system are
there due to a mental health or chemical dependency issue that
92. Id. at 25.
93. Interview with Monica Seidel, Psychotherapist, Univ. of Minn. Cmty.
Univ. Health Care Ctr. (CUHCC), in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 7, 2013). Prior to
the last three years at CUHCC, Ms. Seidel worked for the Wilder Foundation for
ten years, serving as both a school social worker and then a residential therapist in
Wilder’s inpatient residential treatment program. Her areas of expertise include
children’s mental health, childhood trauma, PTSD, integrative therapists, family
systems, and attachment disorders. She received her Master of Social Work from
the University of Minnesota and her Bachelor of Arts from the University of Notre
Dame.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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97

has resulted in their lack of ability to parent. Mental illness alone
is not a barrier to parenting.
XI. HOW DO MENTAL HEALTH AND CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY ISSUES
INTERSECT WITH CHILD PROTECTION AND WHAT IS THE RESULT
As previously discussed, at the beginning of a CHIPS action
and once a child protection social worker gets involved, the parent
is almost routinely sent to a therapist for diagnostic testing or
98
assessment and often receives a chemical dependency evaluation.
This is done to determine what issues, concerns, or struggles the
99
parent may have that is leading to or resulting in parenting issues.
Ultimately, if one cannot care for his or her child, that child will be
removed prior to any diagnosis because in this system the child’s
100
needs are considered the primary needs to be met. However, this
removal of a child from his or her home in and of itself commences
a mindset for most parents—that is, “What do I have to do to get
my child back?” Even at the beginning, it is about the end goal of
regaining that child, not about the possibly much-needed therapy
plan for the parent.
Often one issue pervasively leads to another. This becomes
very relevant in case planning and indicates there should not be a
one-size-fits-all mentality for children or parents when it comes to
mental illness therapies and chemical dependency treatments. For
instance, sometimes the root cause of the functioning issues for the
parent can be addiction to cocaine, methamphetamines, or other
drugs; sometimes the parent suffers from alcohol addiction and
related issues; sometimes the parent is, in fact, dealing with
chemical dependency issues only secondarily to significant mental
health issues such as bipolar disorder or another significant
personality or mood disorder. It is routine for a parent who has
entered the system to suffer from these illnesses and, as a case plan
is being developed, for a child protection social worker to look into
whether a chemical dependency or mental health evaluation and
therapy are necessary. This is where the variety of diagnostic tools
as outlined in the DSM-5 and treatment options come into play.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 7 (2012) (“[T]he best interests
of the child must be the paramount consideration. . . .”).
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Once a referral has been made by a social worker as part of a case
plan to a diagnostician and/or therapist, a parent is required to
work with these professionals as outlined in the case plan. However,
the treatment is outlined and driven by what is required by the law
in the child protection system. It is not governed as much by the
mental health or chemical dependency professionals, which would
be best for the ultimate treatment goals of the parent. But, as
mentioned, parents are often willing to do whatever they can to get
their children returned to their home because they only have a
certain amount of time to “get better” as designed by law.
XII. REALITIES OF TREATMENT AND THERAPIES
Once a parent receives the case plan, one typical requirement
of the plan is to receive individual therapy services, many times
101
regardless of a diagnoses or what a therapist may recommend. A
parent establishes services, and typically on his or her own begins
therapy and receives a diagnostic assessment as outlined in the
102
criteria in the DSM-5. At that point, a therapy treatment plan is
put into play that governs how the individual therapy sessions will
103
work. When a child protection worker learns that a parent has
established a therapist as directed, the worker asks a parent to sign
a release of information so there is communication between the
worker and therapist. This is to ensure that the parent is complying
with therapy attendance and to seek recommendations from the
therapist on future service needs. This is one area where the goals
of therapy and goals of child protection simply do not match up.
Ultimately the parent’s goal with child protection is to be as
compliant and upstanding as possible in an effort to reunify with
his or her child.
Yet, the goal of the parent-client in therapy, from a therapist’s
perspective, is to establish a trusting relationship in order to expose
mental health symptoms and behavioral concerns that are festering
104
and in need of resolution. As stated above, there is a specific
timeline as designed by child protection services and the statutes of
the State of Minnesota for completion of a successful child

101.
102.
103.
104.

See Interview with Monica Seidel, supra note 93.
See DSM-5, supra note 84, at sec. II.
Id. at 19–21.
See id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 6

2014]

CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY & MENTAL HEALTH

1033

105

protection plan. The therapy and the child protection plan are
often not in sync. For instance, some therapy issues are long-term
issues that simply cannot be resolved in a six-month window and
require ongoing therapy even if the parent was to be successful in
the completion of the child protection plan. A client who is
participating in therapy pursuant to the direction of child
protection, if answering and working truthfully with the therapist,
can use the therapy as intended but often does not look “better,” as
106
is needed for a successful child protection case plan. Often there
is reluctance for parents ordered through child protection into
therapy to make good use of the therapeutic relationship—hence a
cycle of a family being in and out of child protection over time may
107
be set in motion. But, in the end, if serious mental health and
chemical dependency issues are not truly dealt with as designed by
mental health professionals, the parent is likely to fail in continued
and future case plans. Therefore, concurrent planning is made that
much more necessary.
108

XIII. CONCLUSION—WHAT NOW?

The history of the development of the timelines for moving
toward “permanency” in a child’s life after removal from the
parents’ home and the development of “concurrent planning”
both in fact have some basis in rational and sociological thought.
The fact that children are often moved from foster home to foster
home, not having an opportunity to attach or have stability and
security within someone’s home, and the realization that in most
cases, placement of a child on a permanent basis with a relative was
in the child’s best interests, have led to a reexamination of the
manner in which children are removed from the home and under

105. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
106. See Interview with Monica Seidel, supra note 93.
107. See id.
108. The comments and opinions expressed in the “Conclusion” section of
this article are those of the authors based on their years of experience and
observations of the interaction between the often conflicting goals of reunification
and permanency. This is particularly true as noted in the other parts of the article
in the overlay of attempts at reunification within the context of actually providing
substantial and effective mental health and chemical dependency services. Thus,
the expressed opinions are based upon the information provided in the early part
of the article, the authors’ experience, and the conflicts reflected in the main body
of the article.
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what circumstances and under what timelines they are returned
home or placed permanently somewhere else.
The problem is that the legal requirements often do not have
any relationship to the likelihood of success in dealing with the
underlying causes of family trauma or family issues. While the
courts look to the social workers and the psychologists for
recommendations regarding treatment, they rarely are allowed to
give the parents sufficient time in that therapy or in the chemical
dependency program to fully deal with the issues underlying the
initial removal.
The courts are forced to move toward permanency on a fast
track, where the items they look at in concluding that permanency
is necessary rarely refer directly to the success of treatment or other
therapy and programs. Rather, they look to the “success” of the
therapy in the short time allowed by the timeline requirement, as
presented by the social workers and the counties. They look to how
long the child has been out of the home, what the parent has done,
and whether the parent has been “compliant” with the
requirements of the “case plan.”
Since the case plans rarely deal initially with the actual issues,
but rather are a sweeping generalization of significant testing and
obligations through various programs as applied to all cases, the
courts rarely have significant information to avoid the strict
requirements of the statutory movement toward permanency.
Additionally, since the “concurrent planners” have, throughout the course of the case, assumed and planned for the failure of
the parents to meet the “case plan goals,” there is the constant
pressure to move toward permanency and to get the case closed
and done. The situation where a parent has been compliant and
has worked hard in therapy, but is not ready to have the child
returned, poses a dilemma for the courts and the counties that the
law does not allow them to contemplate. Rather, the courts are
pushed against the wall to make permanency decisions along with
strict timelines, sometimes regardless of the recommendations of
the treating psychologist.
How courts deal with mental health issues in the juvenile
protection system remains a problem. Even when they rely upon an
initial evaluation, courts are often unable to rely on the ongoing
recommendations of the psychologists. Additionally, parents are
often unable to create a significant trust relationship with treating
psychologists or social workers as a result of knowing that anything
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they say can and will be used in order to prevent their children
from returning home, which causes deep divisions in a system
designed to help children and at least theoretically return them to
the parents.
Since the courts are hamstrung in many cases in their effort to
assist children and families based on the recommendations of the
therapists and the mental health professionals, and since all
assistance, therapy, and program resolutions are an open book not
only to the county workers but the court, and in most cases, the
general public, the flexibility of the court system is severely
hampered.
What is necessary is that the laws be amended in order to give
the courts and the professionals the flexibility to deal with the
treatment issues beyond the scope of the requirements of moving
to a permanency decision and the undermining of treatment
systems by concurrent planning. The failure to integrate mental
health flexibility into the rigidity of the statutory scheme, as we
have seen, rarely meets the “individualized needs” of children, thus
thwarting the original goals of the system to protect children and
families.
The concern about children moving in foster care and not
having permanency has resulted in an unbending system which
often is not able to do what is, in fact, in a child’s best interests and
what will, in fact, reunite the family unit.
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